

**IS CONTRACTING POLICE SERVICES MORE COST EFFECTIVE?
A COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF CONTRACTED POLICE SERVICES
VERSUS DIRECT SERVICE DELIVERY**

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Signature Page

THESIS: IS CONTRACTING POLICE SERVICES
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CONTRACTED POLICE SERVICES
VERSUS DIRECT SERVICE DELIVERY

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Thesis Abstract

Public safety services are needed in every municipality to serve and protect members of the community. There is a growing trend of contracting out public safety services, including police and fire services. This research will explore the cost-benefit analysis of municipalities with contracted police services versus non-contracted. A total of five municipalities were used for this study. The cities of Bradbury, Cudahy and Maywood contract out their services to LASD, while the cities of Monrovia and Sierra Madre have established local police departments. The dependent variable in this study is the cost-effectiveness of contracted versus non-contracted police services. To better understand what contributes to the cost-effectiveness on services, the independent variables considered in the study include each city's budget. There is prior research that suggests that it is more cost-effective to contract police services from neighboring cities or the county than local police departments. Additionally, there are common characteristics found in cities that contract police services that relate to population size. This study found that the cities of Bradbury, Cudahy and Maywood spend less money to provide police services to their communities in comparison to Monrovia and Sierra Madre. While the study had similar results to previous studies, it important to note the study only focuses on cost-effectiveness and does not measure the quality or satisfaction of either police service approach. It is suggested that municipalities consider other factors, in addition to cost-effectiveness, when deciding on a police service approach.

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I. Introduction

Residents across communities in the United States rely on their local governments to provide them with essential services such as road maintenance, street sweeping, utilities, trash and public safety services. According to Hefetz and Warner (2011), there are three methods of service delivery: public delivery, in which a city provides in-house services; public contracting, in which services are contracted from a neighboring city or the county; and private contracting, in which a service is provided by a third-party private vendor. For the purpose of this research, a local government that provides its own services shall be referred to as a non-contract city and cities that opt for public or private contracting will be referred to as a contract city. Additionally, this research will focus on two methods of service delivery: public delivery and public contracting. This research will explore the cost-benefit analysis of municipalities with contracted police services versus non-contracted by comparing the costs associated with police services from a select number of cities within Los Angeles County.

City officials and their city administrators have much to consider when determining the most appropriate method of police services for their communities. One of the determining factors usually involves costs— costs associated with public safety services occupy a large portion of municipal budgets. Nearly 25% of budgets are dedicated to police and fire personnel costs (Brunet, 2015). As a result, there is a growing trend of public contracting for public safety services, such as police and fire. The City of Lakewood was a pioneer for contracting police services from the county. In 1954, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department agreed to provide the city with police services, which would later be

known as the Lakewood Plan. In 2014, as many as half of the municipalities in Los Angeles County contracted their police services with the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD) (Wilson, Weiss, and Chermak, 2014).

Cities with their own police departments are faced with expenses associated to personnel and operating costs; however, they have the benefit of having patrol services available to their communities at all times and do not have to compete with other cities for police services. LASD typically services county jurisdictions such as unincorporated areas of a community that are not serviced by a local police department. When cities contract with LASD, the city agrees to pay LASD in exchange of crime prevention, law enforcement, public order maintenance, emergency response, and other services that may be listed on the agreement. The levels of service provided by LASD vary depending on each city's particular needs and as such, the cost for services reflect those needs. For example, a larger city with a population of 60,000 residents and 6 square miles may require more patrol vehicles compared to a smaller city with a population of 15,000 residents and 2 square miles.

When a City opts to contract police services with the county, LASD is hired to replace the functions a typical local police department would do, such as responding to emergency calls. This approach to providing police services has previously proven to reduce police service costs—on average, residents in cities where services are contracted pay sixty percent less of what residents in cities with local police departments pay (Wilson, Weiss, and Charmak, 2014). In order to assess the cost-benefits of contracted versus non-contracted police services, a total of five municipalities were used for this analysis including three cities that contract out their police services (Bradbury, Cudahy, and

Maywood) and two cities with their own established police departments (Monrovia and Sierra Madre).

In addition to previous literature, the budgets from each city, as well as the service agreements from the three contract cities, were analyzed to determine if there are cost savings associated to contracting out police services. In order to measure the cost-effectiveness, the cost of police services was compared by determining the cost-per-resident in each city. The dependent variable in this study is the cost-effectiveness of contracted versus non-contracted police services. To better understand what contributes to the cost-effectiveness of services, the independent variables considered in the study include each city's budget.

There is prior research that suggests that there are additional benefits to contracting aside from its cost-efficiency. Contracting with LASD allows cities to have access to more resources than otherwise available to a local department such as forensics, traffic enforcement, and crime analysis. Cities also have the option to choose a service that best fits its unique community needs (Wilson, Weiss, and Chermak, 2014). Despite the cost-benefits of contracting police services, this method of service delivery may present challenges in contract managing and as a result, there is the possibility of negligibility and oversight in local government contracts (Girth, Hefetz, Johnston and Warner, 2012; Hefetz and Warner, 2016). In addition, there is risk that through contracting, the city may lose its local identity in the community and there are more limitations to manage the contracted police employee and work culture (Wilson, Weiss and Chermak, 2014).

Other studies find there are common characteristics found in cities that contract police services associated to the city's incorporation date, location, population size, and

demographics. According to a study done by Nelligan and Bourns (2011), contracting service delivery is much more common among cities that have some of the following characteristics: newer, less populated, wealthier and commercially healthy. Of the three contract cities used for this study, only one city was found to be most consistent with the previously found relationship between contract cities and some of the focused population demographics.

The City of Bradbury has been contracting police services from LASD since it incorporated on July 6, 1957 (Contract Law Enforcement Bureau, 2010). The small residential community is home for nearly 1,100 residents. Unlike Bradbury, the other two contract cities broke away from public delivery and a public contract with a nearby municipality. On July 6, 2010, the cities of Cudahay and Maywood began contracting their police services through LASD. Prior to this date, the City of Maywood maintained its own police department and the City of Cudahay contracted their police services from Maywood Police Department (MPD).

The City of Cudahay incorporated on November 10, 1960. The community has nearly 24,000 residents (U.S. Census 2010). Unlike Bradbury and Cudahay, the City of Maywood has been a long-established community that incorporated on September 22, 1924. As mentioned, Maywood recently dissolved their local police department and began contracting with LASD. Based on the 2010 Census, there are an estimated 27,395 residents in the city (City of Maywood Website, 2019).

In order to understand how the cities with contracted police services compare to cities with local departments, the cities of Monrovia and Sierra Madre were included in the analysis. The City of Monrovia was founded May 17, 1886 and incorporated in 1887. The

city has an estimated population of 36,590 residents (U.S. Census 2010). The city is a full-service city which provides public police and fire services. Like Monrovia, the City of Sierra Madre is a full-service city with its own police and fire departments (City of Sierra Madre Website, 2019). According to the 2010 Census Bureau, there is an estimated population of nearly 11,000 residents.

Based on the selected city population demographics, there is evidence to suggest there is a relationship between population size and type of service delivery method—smaller populations are more likely to contract out police services than larger communities. The City of Bradbury is entirely residential and has no commercial properties, this city best fits the typical contract city description with its fairly recent incorporation, small population and affluent community. The cities of Maywood and Cudahy have unique demographic characteristics that are unlike other contract cities. The study of the selected cities also found evidence to support that contract cities spend less monies to provide police services to their communities in comparison to full-service cities like Monrovia and Sierra Madre.

The study was limited to the analysis of prior research on the topic; therefore, trends or service satisfaction with police services could not be accounted for. This research only takes into account the cost-effectiveness of contracting police services. In future studies, service quality should also be taken into account when considering the true cost of police services.

II. Literature Review

In municipal governments, tax payer monies are used to provide public services to the community. In fact, the “[t]ypical city in the U.S. provides about forty distinct services, ranging from public works (e.g., street repair and garbage collection), to public safety (e.g., police and fire), to animal control and maintenance of public recreation areas” (Levin and Tadelis, 2010, p. 511). It is up to municipalities to determine which service delivery options are best suited for their community. Public service delivery options include public delivery (in-house services), public contracting, or private contracting (Hefetz and Warner, 2011).

This following literature will be focusing on how cities choose to provide police services to their communities. Prior to exploring how and why cities are choosing their method of police services, it is important to understand the foundations of government contracting including what factors are considered by elected officials and city managers in selecting a service delivery option, and the most practiced forms of government contracts.

Public Outsourcing

While some cities provide direct service delivery, others resort to outsourcing (contracting) their services. Small cities are 20% more likely than large cities to substitute direct service delivery (Levin and Tadelis, 2010). This is the case for cities like Bradbury, Hidden Hills and Rolling Hills. The practice of public outsourcing allows local governments to provide a public service to its residents through the use of a private vendor, non-profit organization or a government agency. Governments may choose to

partner with non-profits for high-risk services as governments do not anticipate financial opportunism using this approach (Brown, 2008). However, for the purpose of this research, only government-to-government and government-to-private contracts will be discussed.

The International City/County Management Association (ICMA) distributes surveys to municipalities every five years to allow professionals in the field to analyze the use of alternative service delivery options in municipalities. According to Warner (2017), an assessment of the surveys from the years 1992 to 2012 indicate that privatization of service delivery peaked in 1997 with 17.6% of municipalities delivering services using government-to-private contracts; after reaching its peak, the trend then shifted toward a more cooperative approach through intermunicipal cooperation, in other words, government-to-government contracts (Figure 1).




Figure 1: Cooperation is the New Reform (Warner, 2017)

Although this research will focus on government-to-private and government-to-government contracts, it is important to note an alternative approach used among

government agencies—mixed service delivery. This delivery method entails both the government and an outside provider, whether it be a private or public agency, working together to provide a service. Figure 2 below reflects the fluctuation of this method approach indicating that mixed service delivery was most used in 2002 (23.5%) with the data in 2012 showing there has been a decline in usage since then (16.8%) (Warner, 2017). An example of this arrangement can be found in the cities of Azusa, Bradbury and Monrovia. Each city has a Building and Safety Department but due to high demand and limited staff functions, such as plan checking, are delegated to a private contractor.




Figure 2: Mixed Delivery (Warner, 2017)

The information above describes a few service delivery alternatives, but how do city decision-makers choose a service delivery option? Past literature suggests that the choice of service delivery is affected by the measurability of service quality, service characteristics, city characteristics and management preference (Petersen, Hjelmar, and Vrangbaek, 2018; Levin and Tadelis, 2010; Bel, Fageda, and Warner, 2010; Girth, Hefetz, Johnston and Warner, 2012; Hefetz and Warner, 2011).

Measuring Quality of Service

Technical Services versus Social Services

Service quality is a vital component of service delivery; however, it is not something that can be easily measured due to its subjectivity. Although a uniform unit of measure cannot be applied across all services, service quality can be standardized through its input (i.e. resources invested in a service), process (i.e. procedures), and output (i.e. impact of the service) in delivering the service (Petersen, Hjelmar, and Vrangbaek, 2018). In the fast food industry, if a restaurant owner wants to evaluate the food delivery process, he may look at the amount of time it takes staff to process an order—orders per minute. The unit of measure in this scenario is more reliable as it can measure an actual quantity. The process of measuring the customer satisfaction would entail a qualitative measure such as a survey or rating system. Similarly, it is essential for city managers to evaluate the public services they deliver. Many public services can be placed into two categories: technical services and social services (Petersen, Hjelmar, and Vrangbaek, 2018).

Measuring service quality in technical services is much more feasible as there are more reliable quantitative indicators that can illustrate the effect of a service (Petersen, Hjelmar, and Vrangbaek, 2018). Technical services refer to services that require specialized skills to perform a job function. Often these include utilities and other field services such as parks and street maintenance. The City of Monrovia, Public Works Department utilizes a work order system to track the number of requests received. The service requests are logged to report any issues that need to be addressed in the public right-of-way such as trimming trees, filling pot holes, and repairing street lights or traffic

signals. Through the work order system, staff is able to make note of the time and date a work order was received, and the time it takes to complete it. This information allows department heads to analyze the effectiveness of their service delivery.

A technical service that is often contracted out is solid waste. Providing solid waste services internally requires cities to have the equipment and facilities to process trash, recycling materials and green waste. Due to recent legislative changes, cities are facing the potential implementation of organics waste recycling. The requirements and demands associated with providing solid waste services make it complicated for cities to provide direct delivery, which is why they are often contracted out to a private company. Although the city may not directly provide the service, the quality of service can be assessed using tonnage reports which include information on the amount (tonnage) of trash, recycling, green waste and bulky items collected in the city within a three-month period.

On the other hand, social services are much more difficult to measure. The challenge of measuring service quality stems from the nature of social services, which is to provide services of support, outreach, and education in the community. Because these services are so conceptual and there is lack of consensus on what the service outcome should be, there are more challenges to measuring the quality of service (Petersen, Hjelmar, and Vrangbaek, 2018). To overcome some of these challenges, department heads may choose to assess their social services based on a variety of performance measurements. Some cities offer summer camp programs for school-aged children through their recreation departments. The program can be measured by the number of children enrolled and, in some cases, the numbers can be compared to previous years to

evaluate the program's growth and success. Qualitative data can quantify the number of enrollees and staff hours invested in the program; however, it cannot accurately account for the social and academic support the staff is contributing to the program. As mentioned, surveys are often used to measure a customer's satisfaction. It is important to note that surveys are ultimately subjective to the person completing it; therefore, there may be room for a higher margin of error once the data is processed.

Although social services present limitations in service quality measurement and are not seen as ideal to contract out, some cities have found successful methods to contract these types of services. Many communities have access to a public library; however, at times cities are unable to provide residents with this service directly so alternative methods have to be considered. This is the case for the City of Hidden Hills, a small community of 2,000 residents located in the foothills of San Fernando Valley. The city relies on property taxes as its primary source of revenue. Building, maintaining and staffing a city library would not be financially feasible. Through an agreement, the City of Hidden Hills contributes restricted property tax revenue monies to the City of Calabasas which allows Hidden Hills residents to benefit from the services provided by the Calabasas Library.

A commonly contracted out social service is law enforcement. Nearly 45% of cities within Los Angeles County contract their police services through Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD) (Contract Law Enforcement Bureau: Training Bulletin, 2010). Contracting police services is a common trend that is not only occurring in the Los Angeles County, but throughout the nation. A survey on law enforcement services in the state of Michigan found that 28% of local governments provide law enforcement

services, 24% contract services from the county or a neighboring city, and 48% do neither (Horner and Ivacko, 2016). Cities that do not have an established police service delivery method reported relying on the county or state police to respond in emergency situations (Horner and Ivacko, 2016). The contracting of police services is a topic of discussion as measurement of service quality versus its benefits are difficult to assess. However, the challenges and complications of choosing to contract police services will be later discussed in further detail.

Service Characteristics

Asset Specificity & Difficulty of Contract Monitoring

Based on the information presented above, it is evident that service quality measurement is an element of consideration in selecting a service delivery method. The measurability of service quality is relevant to asset specificity and contract monitoring. Asset specificity refers to “the degree to which specialized investments are required to produce a service” (Andrew and Hawkins, 2013, p. 464). To put the term in context, consider the skillset an electrician has to acquire compared to a recreation leader. Both jobs require a level of training to perform their jobs functions; however, while the recreation leader develops skills that can be applicable to other fields (low asset specificity), the electrician develops a unique skillset that can only be applied to a very specific field (high asset specificity). According to a study led by Hefetz and Warner (2011), services that are more asset specific—water, sewer, waste disposal—are less likely to be contracted out compared to services that are less asset specific—parking meter maintenance and parking lots. Asset specificity also has the potential to affect the difficulty of monitoring a contract.

When a city contracts out a service, the city agrees to pay an established rate or fee in exchange of a service delivery. City staff is responsible for ensuring the services listed in the scope of work of the contract are being met at the established rate or fee. There is evidence that oversight in local government contracts are at times neglected and/or inadequate, proving that contract monitoring can be a difficult task (Girth, Hefetz, Johnston and Warner, 2012). In a survey asking city managers to rank each service by difficulty of contract monitoring, managers expressed contract management to be moderately difficult (Hefetz and Warner, 2011). Because asset specific services present more difficulties in contract management, these services are not good candidates to contract out (Hefetz and Warner, 2011).

Hefetz and Warner (2011) noted that local governments have come to heavily rely on vendors for very asset specific services despite the difficulty of monitoring due to their invested infrastructure that places just as much risk on the vendor as it does on the city. Common asset specific services that are contracted out include technical services such as water, trash and sewer. As previously mentioned, the measurement of service quality is more feasible in technical services; therefore, contract management may also be more efficient due to the available data. Small cities can sometimes face budget limitations that may force them to outsource many, if not, all public services. This can present more challenges for local governments that are understaffed; more contracts require additional support to effectively monitor a contract.

Cost

Since the most recent recession, some governments have struggled with tight budgets and looked for alternatives to reduce costs (Faulk and Grassmuck, 2012). While

it was often thought that consolidating services will cut down on a service cost, Faulk and Grassmuck (2012) found that consolidation is not likely to decrease expenditures.

Similar results were found in a study analyzing four consecutive International City/County Management Association (ICMA) surveys (1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007) to determine which conditions influence local governments to terminate some of their services. According to Lamonth and Meeyoung (2016), there was no evidence found that financial stress is a significant factor when deciding to terminate services.

Unlike previous research, more recent evidence supports the argument that service cost may be a factor considered in choosing a service delivery option. In 2012, ICMA distributed a survey profiling local governments and their service delivery methods (Figure 3). The study identified external fiscal pressures and cost savings in service delivery as the top two factors considered by city managers, executive staff, and elected officials when deciding on providing in-house services or contracting out the service¹ (ICMA, 2012). Cost savings ranging between 18% and 45% have been more commonly noted in technical services (Petersen, Hjelmar, and Vrangbaek, 2018). Additionally, an analysis of local governments in New Jersey and surrounding areas found there are significant cost savings in consolidation; however, the cost savings are more often attributed to service efficiency improvements than benefiting from economies of scale² (Faulk and Hicks, 2011).

¹ **2012 ICMA Survey-Profile of Local Government Service Delivery Choices** – The survey was distributed to 7,515 local governments and received 970 responses to this question.

² According to Faulk and Hicks (2011), economies of scale refers to a local government's average service costs as it relates to its population.

Factor	Percent reporting
External fiscal pressures, including restrictions placed on raising taxes, e.g., Proposition 13 (n=574)	59%
Internal attempts to decrease costs of service delivery (n=848)	87%
State or federal mandates tied to intergovernmental financing (n=116)	12%
Change in political climate emphasizing a decreased role for government (n=221)	23%
Active citizen group favoring privatization (n=79)	8%
Unsolicited proposals presented by potential service providers (n=168)	17%
Concerns about government liability (n=96)	10%
Other (n=104)	11%

Figure 3: ICMA Survey - Profile of Local Government Service Delivery Choices (2012)

In an analysis of local government consolidation, Faulk and Hicks (2011) found that per resident costs are lower in medium and larger cities compared to smaller cities. Faulk and Hicks (2011) theorize that a possible explanation may be that the cost of a service is lower because the cost is distributed among more taxpayers in cities with higher populations. While this seemed to be the case when contracting from the private sector, city-county consolidation yielded different results. There appeared to be a relationship between population size and service expenditures, yet the results did not

show significant cost savings and suggest that the size of a county slightly impacts the cost per capita (Faulk and Grassmueck, 2012).

City Characteristics

City managers and administrators have the responsibility of overseeing the city's day-to-day operations and making recommendations to elected officials on a variety of issues, including public service delivery. Unfortunately, there is no "size-fits all" when it comes to operating and providing public services in a city. These decisions are tailored according to the community's unique demands and needs which research shows are influenced by the city's characteristics such as the city's location and citizen involvement (Girth et al., 2012; Minkoff, 2013).

Location

As previously mentioned, cost can be a determining component in choosing to contract out a service. While cost is not directly affected by location, location plays a significant role in the local market conditions and the service delivery options available. When a city is looking to contract out a service, a Request for Proposals (RFP) must be released. An RFP provides information on the project or service that is being sought out (i.e. scope of work). The RFP process benefits both the city and the vendor, and helps prevent issues relating to nepotism by creating a competitive market. Interested vendors submit a bid to contract out their services to the city, while providing cities with multiple vendor options at a competitive market price.

Location has proven to play a key role in how communities are serviced. Metropolitan areas tend to attract more private vendors compared to rural areas. Large

cities in metropolitan areas do not generally contract out services because they benefit from having the resources needed to provide efficient in-house services (Girth et al., 2012). The City of Los Angeles is ideally centered in a large metropolitan area that attracts tourists, businesses and other guests. The amount of attention received gives the city the ability to generate revenue through various venues such as commercial businesses, taxes, and permit fees; therefore, they have a larger resource pool that allows them to provide direct service delivery for utilities, such as light and water. Rural cities are vulnerable given they do not attract as many private vendors interested in providing services. The lack of interested may limit their service provider options; thus, costs often do not reflect that of a competitive market (Girth et al., 2012).

Civic Engagement

Although decision-makers may tend to focus their attention to service costs in order to maintain fiscal sustainability, residents and city guests are observant of the services provided. Evidence shows that the level of citizen involvement may vary based on the city's location. Minkoff (2013) explains that residents living in metropolitan areas are more informed of projects and policies developing in surrounding communities, which allow them to assess how their own community compares to others; thus, these communities may experience a higher demand of policy development. In 2017, the City of Bradbury, Planning Department received a project proposal to add a second-story to a house located in a neighborhood with single-story homes. The city distributed notices to residents living within 500 feet of the property for input. Residents expressed their concern of allowing two-story units in fear of losing the neighborhood's unique character and privacy. Community members argued that residents in the City of Arcadia lost much

of their privacy with the development of large, two-story homes that tower over the original single-story homes in the neighborhood. The residents compared the outcome of the development policies in the City of Arcadia to encourage the elected officials to adopt an ordinance prohibiting the development of second-story homes in the neighborhood.

Citizen involvement not only has the capacity to influence policy, it also monitors the service quality of public services (Hefetz and Warner, 2011). Although staff may try their best to be aware of what is happening in the city, they often rely on community feedback. Residents are the eyes and ears of the community and can communicate any issues or areas of concern to the city. For example, in a recent Bradbury council meeting, residents expressed dissatisfaction with the city's water service provider, CalAmerican Water, due to the frequent water leaks and the damages incurred on the road while repairing leaks. Resident concerns were heard by the elected officials and the issue was agendaized for the June council meeting to discuss the services provided by CalAmerican Water. Without the community's input, it would be difficult for city staff to know there is an issue and assume water services are satisfactory. Civic engagement allows the city to keep vendors accountable for the services they provide.

Managerial Flexibility

When cities that provide direct services face fiscal stress or a fluctuation in service demand, managers are forced to make staff adjustments within their departments. Sometimes these adjustments can mean increasing or downsizing staff. Contracting services gives managers the flexibility to increase or decrease staff force depending on the project or service needs (Lamothe and Lamothe, 2015). The City of Monrovia has a Parks Division which provides maintenance of city trees, public parks, landscape and

medians. Although the city has the ability to have a Parks Division comprised of city employees, there is need to contract out some services, such as tree trimming, because the city's demands exceed its resources of man-power and equipment. Using this approach allows the city to contract additional support when needed without the hassle of hiring city employees which requires a lengthy recruitment process and employee benefits.

Contracting services has the advantage of allowing staff flexibility; however, direct service delivery is often seen as an advantage to contracting due to the capability of service continuity and oversight of service quality (Brown, 2008). There is limited authority over a contracted service even if there is the possibility of breaking the contract. A contracted service team has its own organizational hierarchy they report to, making oversight of the service a challenge. Additionally, the contracted staff may not be as invested in the organization. On the other hand, in-house staff reports directly to the city and may be more invested in the organization as a result. This not only allows better oversight of their services, but if the organization has high employee morale, the quality of service may reflect the employees' pride in their work. Although it can be argued that perhaps contracted services may perform better because there is the threat of shedding a contract, in-house services can be better managed directly by the city and services are up to par with the city's mission and values.

Dynamics of Government Contracts

Government-to-Government

Intergovernmental contracting allows for cities to provide a service through another public agency, such as a neighboring city, county, or state. Research suggests

there is a preference to provide direct service delivery for public safety and other human services; however, if the service is contracted out, it is most likely the service is contracted out to another public agency through interjurisdictional agreements (Girth et al., 2012; Andrew, 2009). Interjurisdictional agreements (IJAs) often come in the form of two types of agreements—restrictive and adaptive arrangements. Restrictive arrangements are legal-binding agreements in which expectations and outcomes are predetermined while adaptive agreements, on the other hand, utilize vague contract language to allow room for flexibility (Andrew and Hawkins, 2012). Each form of arrangement is best suited for particular services.

Restrictive arrangements are legal agreements best used when there are monetary transactions involved (Andrew and Hawkins, 2012). Although this type of arrangement is most common in public safety services (i.e. police and fire), cities also benefit from contracting other types of services from neighboring cities or the county. As mentioned, the City of Bradbury contracts out most of their services. Typically, cities have a public works department which entails engineering services and maintenance of the public right-of way. In this case, Bradbury contracts its engineering services with a private vendor while utilizing Los Angeles County Public Works to provide some general maintenance such as placement of street signs and catch basin maintenance.

Other services that are needed on an on-call basis or require modifications to accommodate service demands benefit from an adaptive arrangement (Andrew and Hawkins, 2012). These arrangements do not necessarily involve money and may come in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or Mutual Aid Agreement (MAA) which establish an agreement without the legal formality of a contract. Although MOUs

and MAAs are not considered legal documents, they serve as an agreement between two or more jurisdictions. The differentiating factor between the two is that a MAA is reciprocated, while an MOU does not have to. These arrangements are common between different levels of government (local, county, state and federal agencies), schools, non-profits and occasionally for-profit companies in emergency situations. An example of this relationship is the arrangement established through the eight Disaster Management Areas in Los Angeles County. The City of Bradbury is one of twenty-three (23) partner cities for Area D³. Each Disaster Management Area is assigned a Disaster Management Area Coordinator (DMAC). The DMACs are acting liaisons between governments and other participating stakeholders that help develop and maintain MAAs, assist with emergency management activities and education. Through this unique partnership, some agencies have been able to initiate dialogue with Cal Poly, Pomona to establish an MOU to shelter equine during emergency evacuations. Collaborating and creating partnerships has proven to be an effective way to deliver services and expand resources.

Normally cities compete against each other to attract residents and guests in the community; however, agreements are seen as a tool to complete projects or deliver a service that benefit all participating stakeholders (Minkoff, 2013). The cities of Bradbury and Duarte often work collaboratively to ensure the safety and wellbeing of their communities. The layout of the of the cities create an overlap in which a portion of Duarte, known as the Baldy Mesa, is located above Bradbury. The Baldy Mesa

³ Area D is comprised of twenty-three (23) partner cities including Arcadia, Azusa, Baldwin Park, Bradbury, Claremont, Covina, Diamond Bar, Duarte, El Monte, Glendora, Industry, Irwindale, La Puente, La Verne, Monrovia, Pomona, Rosemead, San Dimas, Sierra Madre, South El Monte, Temple City, Walnut, and West Covina.

neighborhood is therefore only accessible through Bradbury. In 2018, a series of burglaries sparked attention from residents in both communities. In order to address the issue, Bradbury and Duarte entered into an agreement to purchase Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) and place them at the entrance accessing both communities. As part of the agreement, the cities split the costs for the purchase and maintenance of two ALPRs. Similar to Bradbury and Duarte, many communities benefit working together to achieve a common goal.

Government-to-Private

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) allow for local governments to delegate public services to private firms and/or companies through long-term contracting (Reynaers, 2014). The theoretical approach for contracting services with a private agency is property rights theory, which is comprised of two components: competition argument and ownership argument.

The competitive argument entails that the private sector naturally presents an element of competition due to the availability of other businesses eager to build clientele; thus, private sector providers are forced to maintain efficiency in their business. On the contrary, public organizations lack the same level of competition and incentives to provide efficient services—ownership argument (Petersen, Hjelmar and Vrangbaek, 2018). In essence, it is believed that private sector providers can provide more efficient services than public agencies, which in turn are often associated with cost savings.

Despite the benefits of contracting to a business in the private sector, there is concern of how they may affect public organizations. According to Brown (2008),

private firms may jeopardize public values and goals in an attempt to keep costs lower. It is possible that private sector providers may not carry the organization's values in their work. While an agreement can ensure that a minimum service level be provided, there is not much control on the quality of the service received. There are limitations on contract management which present the risk of oversight. The employees of a private service provider directly report to their management. If there is an issue or concern, city staff communicates with the provider's management team. The information is then trickled down to the contracted team to address the issue or concern. Considering there is limited direct communication between city staff and contracted staff, it is difficult to instill the organization's values in their work. Furthermore, it is also possible that contracted service providers do not feel as invested in the public agency which can

Contracting Police Services

The literature above provided background information on public service delivery methods and why local governments choose to provide either direct service delivery for some services while contracting for others. The following will provide the reader with a better understanding of how the information relates to police services.

Police services are an essential part of a local government agency and therefore, the method it is delivered should be carefully approached. The contracting of police services is a common practice across the nation. In fact, according to a 2013 ICMA survey research, approximately 72% of municipalities provide police services through the

county, while nearly 9% contract with a neighboring police department⁴ (Figure 4). Of the 478 cities in the state of California, nearly 30% of them contract with the county sheriff for police services (Nelligan and Bourns, 2011). Considering that governments may be seen as more reliable because they are less likely to break contract in order to maintain a good relationship with the contracting agency, it is quite possible this is why local governments resort to contracting with other public agencies for police services (Brown, 2008). However, there are pros and cons associated with each service method approach when it comes to police services.




Figure 4: ICMA Survey – Police and Fire Personnel, Salaries, and Expenditures (2013)

⁴ **Police and Fire Personnel, Salaries, and Expenditures (2013)**—The survey was distributed to local governments with a population of more than 10,000. Of the 4,227 distributed surveys, only 137 cities responded.

History of Contracting

In 1954, the City of Lakewood incorporated in order to prevent annexation with the City of Long Beach (Prager, 2008). With limited staff and resources available, the newly formed city found the only way to provide municipal services were through contracts. Lakewood was a pioneer in utilizing this new method of service delivery and thus, became known as the first contract city (Prager 2008). Among the many services contracted, policing was one of them. Upon incorporation, the City of Lakewood contracted Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD) for police services, making it the first agreement of its kind (Contract Law Enforcement Bureau Training Bulletin, 2010).

Police service consolidation comes in the form of two types of contracts: 1) city-county contracting, and 2) city-city contracting. City-county services occur when a city contracts police services from the county sheriff's department. Since LASD's first use of intergovernmental contracts in 1954, approximately 45% of cities in Los Angeles County contract with LASD (Contract Law Enforcement Bureau Training Bulletin, 2010). Under city-county contracts, the county sells their services at a uniform cost per unit rate, which ultimately helps cities save monies (Gomez, Perez, and Smith, 2015). Alternatively, city-city contracting allows for a group of cities to provide shared police safety services (Gomez, Perez, and Smith, 2015). Many advocate for the consolidation of smaller police agencies to form larger departments arguing that:

- “[N]ew police technologies cost more than most small departments can afford;
- Large departments make cost-efficient the hiring of specialist experts that small departments cannot afford;

- Small communities can-not afford to deal with the increasing litigation or threat of litigation against the police;
- Larger departments can afford to hire better-qualified personnel and give them more training; and,
- Larger departments can provide more and better service by achieving economies of scale and larger agencies are better equipped to adapt to the changing nature of crime” (as cited by Mastrofski and Willis, 2010, p. 61).

Much of the information offered on consolidation argues that cost-benefit is a significant benefit to this approach for police services. The information below explores the cost-savings benefits and limitations associated with police consolidation.

Contracted Police Services versus Local Police Departments

Cost Savings

Like with other public services, city administrators and elected officials weigh in the cost of providing police services whether it be through direct service delivery or contracting with another agency. Nearly 25% of cities’ budgets are used to fund police services; therefore, when a city experiences fiscal stress, it has the potential to affect the way police services are provided (Brunet, 2014).

In order to alleviate some of the fiscal stress, cities may resort to making difficult decisions such as downsizing their police department force to cut down costs, yet, cities are finding other methods to reach fiscal sustainability while maintaining their level of police services. Currently, the fiscal impacts of providing direct police service delivery has begun to reflect challenges in the City of Arcadia. In the Spring 2019 Arcadia

Community News, the city provided information on Measure A, a proposed $\frac{3}{4}$ cent sales tax measure being placed in the upcoming June 2019 ballot. According to the community update, Measure A has the potential to determine the quality of service provided by the Arcadia Police Department. The financial stress in the city has been experiencing has already impacted the police department by eliminating five officers from the police force since 2008. Unfortunately, if the city does not find a solution to finance its current police force, they may have to eliminate thirteen police officer positions. The Metro Gold Line extension has created a venue for transients to settle in communities along the San Gabriel Valley, including Arcadia. Members of the community have noticed these effects and rely on the Arcadia Police Department to ensure the safety and peace-keeping in the community. Such a significant reduction in the number of officers could lead to negative impacts on patrolling services and response times, and as a result, be reflected in the level of crime in the community.

The City of Arcadia is just one example of how some agencies struggle to provide quality police services with a constrained budget. This scenario is not uncommon and it adds a lot of pressure on decision-makers to make the right choice for their communities. The most frequently cited reason to contract police services through the county is fiscal stress. Because of the fiscal stress associated with providing in-house police services, some cities prefer to save money by contracting police services from the county. According to Brunet's study (2014), there are cost-savings associated with disbanding a local agency and contracting out police services. The City of Bessemer, saved between \$250,000 and \$300,000 by contracting out their police services which eliminated

department operating costs such as “insurance, retirement, uniform, patrol car maintenance, and training” (Brunet, 2014, p. 13).

For the cities of Corte Madera, Larkspur and San Anselmo, consolidation was the solution to providing police services while experiencing budget constraints. On January 1, 2013, the cities joined forces to form the Central Marin Police Authority which provides police services to a population of about 34,300 residents while offering a combined cost-savings of \$1.68 million (“California City Solution,” 2015). The consolidation of the departments has been well-received by the community. The combined resources have allowed a stronger community-based police presence, a broader range of police services, faster response times, and a decline in incidents of crime (“California City Solution,” 2015).

Cost savings is often associated with the contracting of police services; however, some cities may argue their experience with contracting contradicts this commonly cited benefit. In a recent survey of nine California cities that terminated their police service contracts with the county, found that eight of the nine cities listed service cost as a reason to change their service delivery method⁵. These findings are in line with early research on police contracts with Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department which suggest that it is not more cost-efficient to consolidate police services (Finney, 1997). According to the City of Mendota, “[t]he costs for police services have increased 61 over the last two fiscal years, without an increase of service” (as cited by Zeemering, 2018, p. 601). The City of

⁵ The nine cities that terminated their police service contracts with the county include: Avenal (2010), Citrus Heights (2006), Elk Grove (2006), Maricopa (2006), Mendota (2009), Orange Cove (2009), San Ramon (2007), Tehachapi (2007), and Truckee (2001). The only city that did not list service cost as a reason to break away from their contract is the City of Orange Cove.

Maricopa also experienced an increase in cost of nearly \$70,000 upon contract renewal (Zeemering, 2018). Although monetary cost is an important factor to consider in service provision, the cost is only a fraction compared to service quality.

Service Quality

Approximately 6% of cities with consolidated police services terminated their contracts within a nine-year window between the years 2001 and 2010 (Zeemering, 2018)⁶. This raises a big question—why do cities choose to provide in-house police services?

Policing services look different in every municipality. It is up to the elected officials to determine which services best reflect the values and demands of the community. As previously mentioned, one of the challenges in contracting a service is oversight limitations. Considering that policing is a critical public service, these oversight limitations can raise concern in some communities. According to Andy Skoogman (as cited in Robins, 2018), executive director of the Minnesota Chiefs of Police Association:

Local, community-based control and oversight of policing is reflective in the policies and practices that govern the way law enforcement officers interact in the community. Though we understand the economic challenges faced by small communities, we do not regard the outsourcing of essential public safety services as an effective tool for budget management.

⁶ According to Zeemering (2018), nine of the 148 cities in California that consolidate police services terminated their contracts.

These concerns were in line with the City of Tehachapi, which found the community's growth could benefit from the establishment of its own department. According to the City of Tehachapi:

...future growth in the City over the next five years may make alternative approaches more attractive in terms of cost, building a strong public safety base for the future and level of service. And finally, the City's desire to more proactively set priorities and establish a policing philosophy unique to Tehachapi may best be achieved through other service delivery approaches (as cited by Zeemering, 2018, p. 601).

Using a city-county contract approach leaves much control to the county rather than the city, which may present issues of service quality (Gomez, Perez, and Smith, 2015). As a result, some cities prefer to terminate their contract and provide in-house services to have more local control of the service levels, place higher emphasis on community priorities, and build a stronger relationship with the community (Zeemering, 2018). For example, cities that place a strong value in community-based policing may host events, such as coffee with a cop, to provide the community with an opportunity to connect and interact with officers in an informal setting. On the contrary, this type of relationship would be rare to find in cities where services are contracted out. Although rare, it does not mean it does not exist.

The City of Rancho Cucamonga has a unique arrangement with the San Bernardino County Sheriff Department. The City of Rancho Cucamonga provides the sheriff department with its own facilities and vehicles that were purchased by the city. This arrangement gives the city responsibility of building and fleet maintenance while receiving the benefit of more resource availability through the county. The relationship

the city has with the sheriff department gives Rancho Cucamonga the ability to be more hands-on with what is happening in the department and provide direct influence on the values portrayed by the department. However, this arrangement is made possible by the amount of monies the city is able to pay the county. This is not the case for all communities.

Who Is Contracting Police Services?

Consolidation through contracting allows for smaller local governments to provide public safety services at an affordable cost. In governments with a population of 4,000 or less may be able to reduce police service costs by merging with other government units (Faulk and Hicks, 2011). “Consolidation of police functions would save \$946,000 in the average sized county (a merger of two departments only), and over \$4.5 million in large counties (Faulk and Hicks, 2011, p. 17).

It appears governments are influenced by the services their neighboring communities provide—the probability of a local government shedding a service lowers in local governments where their neighbors all provide that service (Lamothe and Lamothe, 2015). Local governments often look at what other organizations are doing for guidance on their administration approach. Elected officials, city managers and other executives talk amongst each other to learn what works and what does not work for different communities. Considering Lamothe and Lamothe’s statement on the relationship between service shedding and service provisions in neighboring communities, this would indicate that if a city provides in-house police services, it is likely that the neighboring communities do too. The same would apply for cities contracting police services.

An analysis of municipalities in New York observed that demographic changes influence how police services are delivered. The findings from the analysis allowed researchers to develop a matrix (Figure 5) that illustrates which municipalities benefit from shared police services.

	<i>Highly favorable opportunities for shared police</i>	<i>Moderately favorable opportunities for shared police</i>	<i>Less favorable opportunities for shared police</i>	
Police force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decreasing population • Weak income growth 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decreasing population • Moderate or strong income growth 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing population • Moderate or weak income growth 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing population • Strong income growth
No police force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing population • Strong income growth 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing population • Moderate or weak income growth 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decreasing population • Moderate or strong income growth 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decreasing population • Weak income growth

Note: Weak income growth is income growth that does not keep pace with state average; moderate growth is less than 10 percent growth relative to the state average; strong growth is growth that exceeds 10 percent of the state average.

Figure 5: Matrix for Targeting Shared Services (Lamothe and Lamothe, 2015)

The matrix implicates the following:

More Favorable Opportunities for Shared Services

1. Cities that provide in-house police services, are decreasing in population size and have rising income levels at an annual rate lower than the state average are suitable candidates for consolidated police services. Should cities fitting this description continue to decrease in population size and experience less than average growth of income, they may be forced to eventually disband their own police force and consolidate with the county or state.

2. Cities that do not have in-house police services, are increasing in population, and have an income growth higher than the state average may be more open to shared police services provided by a neighboring local agency rather than the county or state.

Less Favorable Opportunities for Shared Services

1. Cities that provide in-house police services, are increasing in population and experience income growth at higher levels than the state average are not good candidates for shared police services. These cities are not likely to change their level of service considering they have the resources available to finance a local agency due to their growing population size and income. This indicates that more affluent communities are inclined toward having their own police force.
2. Cities that do not provide in-house police services, are losing population, and have less than state average income growth are not ideal candidates for shared services. These cities may focus their attention on the cost savings associated with consolidating services through the county or state (Carrizales, Melitski, and Schwester, 2010).

In essence, a city's population is more significant than the city's income when determining whether it is a favorable candidate for shared police services. Cities with higher population densities are more likely to have or eventually establish their own police force; therefore, population growth is a key component in deciding how to provide police services (Carrizales, Melitski, and Schwester, 2010). For example, both City A and City B have a local police department but are considering consolidating their services. City A has a steady increase in population but unstable income growth. On the

other hand, City B is decreasing in population but has a steady income growth. According to Carrizales, Melitski and Schwester (2010), City A is a more favorable candidate for shared services than City B because of its higher population. Overall, larger communities are more likely to have an established local police department. A study on Michigan governments found that 61% of local governments with a population between 10,001 and 30,000 residents confirmed having local police departments as well as 82% of local governments with more than 300,000 residents (Horner and Ivacko, 2016).

A study examining the potential savings of consolidating services with other local government agencies in the state of Jersey and surrounding states (i.e. Connecticut, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New York) found that the per resident cost for police services in smaller governments is higher compared to medium and larger-sized governments. In counties with a population size of less than 500,000, per capita police service costs increase by \$6.23 for each additional local government agency within a county.

Additionally, Nelligan and Bourns (2011) note the following characteristics in contract cities:

- Cities in Southern California are more likely to contract than cities in Northern California;
- Contract cities are newer and are less populated;
- Contract cities do not have much commercial or business activity;
- Contract have higher household incomes;

- Contract cities have lower crime rates—this may also indicate that there are cost savings associated due to lesser demand for police services.

The described characteristics covered in this section will be considered as the cost-savings are analyzed in the cities of Bradbury, Cudahy, Duarte, Maywood, Monrovia, and Sierra Madre.

III. Methodology

The literature above describes the many factors that are considered by city managers/administrators, elected officials and other decision-makers when choosing a police service delivery method. While there are many influential factors in the decision-making process, this thesis research is focused on the cost of providing police services through direct service delivery (in-house) and government-to-government contracts. As part of the research process, existing literature such as online scholarly sources, journals related to the public administration field, and case study articles were analyzed. Each source contributed to the understanding of public service delivery, the dynamic of government contracts and the pros/cons of contracting police services. In addition, secondary research was conducted to support and/or argue the findings from the content analysis. Because the research did not incorporate surveys, participation of test subjects, and primarily relied on literature for data, IRB was not required for this research.

In order to compare costs of each police service method approach. Five cities in the Los Angeles County were selected for this study including the cities of Bradbury, Cudahy, Maywood, Monrovia and Sierra Madre. The cities were not selected at random. The cities of Cudahy and Maywood were the most recent cities to enter into an intergovernmental contract with LASD beginning in 2010. The author of this thesis is a current employee of the City of Bradbury and has first-hand experience of the relationship between LASD, the community and city staff. Lastly, the cities of Monrovia and Sierra Madre were selected as they are found to be comparable in population size with the other selected cities, in exception of Bradbury.

To conduct a cost-benefit analysis, the adopted budgets for Fiscal Year 2018-19 of each city were retrieved using the corresponding city websites. The City of Cudahy did not have the document available on the website; therefore, a Public Record Request was submitted to retrieve this information. Additionally, the population size of each city was found using the information available from the 2010 U.S. Census data. The police service budgets were then divided by the city's population size to determine an approximate cost per resident. The cities' police service costs were compared based on the formulated cost per resident.

Although quantitative data can be found using this methodology, there were challenges presented throughout this study. One of the biggest challenges is trying to compare five cities with different available information. The budget documents for the cities of Monrovia and Sierra Madre provide a description of the services provided by their local departments as well as information on the number of personnel. On the contrary, the budgets for Bradbury, Cudahy, and Maywood do not have a service cost breakdown like Monrovia and Sierra Madre because their services are contracted through LASD. The information provided on their budgets reflect the overall cost associated with the contracted service provision. Although service agreements were provided by each contracted city, additional information related to the types of services provided and/or number of personnel assigned to the cities is not available.

Another challenge to this study was obtaining current population numbers for each city. Population numbers used to formulate a cost-per-resident unit were obtained using the Census information collected in 2010, which is nearly a decade ago. The

population size may have increased and/or decreased which may impact the evaluation of the city's police service costs.

IV. Results

As previously mentioned, evidence suggests that cities utilize approximately a quarter of their budget toward police services (Brunet, 2014). Figures 1 through 5 depict how the selected cities allocate their general fund monies which range from as low as 15% (Monrovia) to 46% (Cudahy). The pie charts presented in the figures below appear to show contracting cities allocate more money toward police services, in exception of Bradbury, compared to cities with local police departments; however, after comparing costs using a uniform unit of measure (i.e. cost-per-resident), the cost-analysis of police services tells a different story.




Figure 6: City of Bradbury

Fiscal Year 2018-19




Figure 7: City of Cudahy




Figure 8: City of Maywood




Figure 9: City of Monrovia




Figure 10: City of Sierra Madre

The findings using the cost-per-resident analysis are consistent with previous research that contracting with the county is more cost-efficient. The contract cities are able to provide their residents with police services at a lower per unit cost. The cost-per-resident analysis shown in Figure 6 suggests that the contracting cities (i.e. Bradbury, Cudahy, and Maywood) have a lower cost-per-resident than the cities of Monrovia and Sierra Madre, which have local police departments.

Previous research also suggested that cities that are newer and less populated are more likely to contract police services. While this was not the focus of the study, Bradbury aligns with these characteristics. The city began contracting services upon its incorporation in 1957. The city is also the least populated compared to the other cities

used in this study. However, a relationship cannot be confirmed because additional data and studies would need to be conducted to determine the relationship.

City	Police Budget	Population	Cost-per-Resident
Bradbury	\$ 113,315	1,048	\$ 108.13
Cudahy	\$ 4,067,180	23,805	\$ 170.85
Maywood	\$ 4,137,499	27,395	\$ 151.03
Monrovia	\$ 16,845,456	36,590	\$ 460.38
Sierra Madre	\$ 3,722,400	10,917	\$ 340.97

Figure 11: Cost-per-Resident

There was much concern noted in other studies regarding the quality of contracted police services. Although this research was limited in information relating to what the police services include in the contracted cities, contract cities have the ability to request additional services that are at the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department capacity (Appendices A & B). All contracted cities included the following in their service agreements: “The City is not limited to the services indicated in Attachment A, but the City may also request any other service in the field of public safety, law, or related fields within the legal power of the Sheriff to provide” (City of Maywood, 2010; City of Bradbury, 2014; and City of Cudahy, 2010).

With cities having the flexibility to request additional resources serves as a benefit to the community. Unlike a city that has its own police department, the city does not face the challenge of hiring or letting go of officers when there is change in police services demands because the County already has the resources readily available for the cities’ disposal.

V. Conclusion

The purpose of this study is to compare the financial costs of police services in cities that have established local police departments versus contracted police services. In order to determine which method is most cost-effective, the study included a thorough content analysis along with a cost-benefit analysis using five cities within the Los Angeles County including: Bradbury, Cudahy, Maywood, Monrovia and Sierra Madre.

This thesis study confirms that on a cost-per-resident basis, police services are more cost-efficient by contracting with the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department. The contracted cities spent between \$108.13 and \$170.85 per resident compared to the cities that have local police departments which have a cost ranging from \$340.97 to \$460.38. From a financial perspective, contracting services is the most convenient and cost-effective approach to providing police services for communities. This gives smaller cities the ability to have access to a variety of resources at a lower cost.

There are limitations to this research the reader should note. As previously mentioned, some challenges in the study included lack of information on particular policing services in contracted cities and the outdated population numbers used to determine a cost-per-resident unit. These challenges pose limitations to the study because it does not allow for an overall comparison of each city's level of service and the cost-per-resident may not reflect an updated, accurate number. Additionally, previous studies highlighted that aside from cost, service quality of is another concern to decision-makers. This study only encompasses the cost for services and cannot reflect the service quality for each city's service delivery.

In order to avoid some of the limitations explained, it is recommended that future studies request an updated Sheriff's Department SH-AD 575 Deployment of Personnel form from contract cities. These forms include information on the service level authorization, and hours of service and estimated charges. These forms may be able to provide a better idea of what each contract city's current services include. For the best opportunity to use a more accurate unit of measure, research should be conducted within the first year after a U.S. Census survey to have updated population. Finally, it is recommended that service quality be measured using surveys and/or conducting case studies on cities that disbanded their local police departments to contract with LASD. Cities that may be ideal for such case studies include:

1. Lynwood (1977 - Present) – disbanded local police department and contracted with LASD.
2. Avalon (1962 - Present) – disbanded local police department and contracted with LASD.
3. Hawaiian Gardens (1964 -1995; 1997 - present) – the city contracted with LASD upon incorporation and terminated their contract when the city established their local police department. The police department was disbanded and the city began to contract services from the county again (Contract Law Enforcement Bureau Training Bulletin, 2010).

If future research includes the suggested information, it is believed that decision-makers will be able to have a more accurate picture of what contracting police services entails aside from cost.

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Appendix A: Master Rate Sheet

Contract City
Master Rate Sheet

Fiscal Year:
2018-2019
Liability Rate:
10.5%

DSSU Rates

Rank	Relief Factor	Annual Rate	Service Code
Deputy Sheriff	Non-Relief	\$ 264,360	310
Deputy Sheriff	40-Hour Unit	\$ 290,796	306
Deputy Sheriff	56-Hour Unit	\$ 407,115	307
Deputy Sheriff	70-Hour Unit	\$ 508,894	308
Deputy Sheriff	84-Hour Unit	\$ 610,673	309
Special Assignment Officer	Non-Relief	\$ 264,360	310
Special Assignment Officer	40-Hour Unit	\$ 290,796	306
Special Assignment Officer	56-Hour Unit	\$ 407,115	307
Special Assignment Officer	70-Hour Unit	\$ 508,894	308
Special Assignment Officer	84-Hour Unit	\$ 610,673	309
Catalina Deputy	Non-Relief	\$ 257,940	324

DSSU Bonus I Rates

Rank	Relief Factor	Annual Rate	Service Code
Deputy Sheriff, Bonus I	Non-Relief	\$ 281,354	305
Deputy Sheriff, Bonus I	40-Hour Unit	\$ 309,490	301
Deputy Sheriff, Bonus I	56-Hour Unit	\$ 433,286	302
Deputy Sheriff, Bonus I	70-Hour Unit	\$ 541,607	303
Deputy Sheriff, Bonus I	84-Hour Unit	\$ 649,929	304

Growth/Grant Deputy Rates

Rank	Relief Factor	Annual Rate	Service Code
Growth Deputy Generalist	Non-Relief	\$ 179,425	335
Growth Special Assignment Officer	Non-Relief	\$ 179,425	335
Growth Deputy Bonus I	Non-Relief	\$ 194,726	336
Growth Motor Deputy	Non-Relief	\$ 194,726	336
Grant Deputy Generalist	Non-Relief	\$ 179,425	386
Grant Special Assignment Officer	Non-Relief	\$ 179,425	386
Grant Deputy Bonus I	Non-Relief	\$ 194,726	385
Grant Motor Deputy	Non-Relief	\$ 194,726	385

Supplemental Positions

Rank	Relief Factor	Annual Rate	Service Code
Captain	Non-Relief	\$ 360,467	321
Lieutenant	Non-Relief	\$ 283,498	342
Sergeant	Non-Relief	\$ 235,863	353
Motor Sergeant	Non-Relief	\$ 248,836	348
Motor Deputy	Non-Relief	\$ 281,354	305A
Watch Deputy	Non-Relief	\$ 191,250	354
Community Services Assistant (w/ veh)	Non-Relief	\$ 62,911	325
Community Services Assistant (w/out veh)	Non-Relief	\$ 62,295	327
Crime Analyst	Non-Relief	\$ 129,151	329
Custody Assistant	Non-Relief	\$ 104,741	331
Forensic ID Specialist II	Non-Relief	\$ 156,931	356
Information Systems Analyst I	Non-Relief	\$ 140,444	332
Intermediate Clerk	Non-Relief	\$ 68,474	338
Law Enforcement Technician (w/ veh)	Non-Relief	\$ 99,231	340
Law Enforcement Technician (w/out veh)	Non-Relief	\$ 94,900	339
Operations Assistant I	Non-Relief	\$ 90,325	343
Operations Assistant II	Non-Relief	\$ 112,216	344
Operations Assistant III	Non-Relief	\$ 128,509	345
Secretary V	Non-Relief	\$ 99,217	346
Security Assistant	Non-Relief	\$ 49,916	362
Security Officer	Non-Relief	\$ 79,074	347
Senior Information Systems Analyst	Non-Relief	\$ 183,743	334
Station Clerk II	Non-Relief	\$ 83,468	351
Supervising Station Clerk	Non-Relief	\$ 100,942	352

Appendix B: Public Safety Equipment Use Rates

CONTRACT CITY PUBLIC SAFETY EQUIPMENT USE RATES

City: Bradbury Fiscal Year: 2018-2019

ANNUAL COSTS WITH MAINTENANCE & FUEL							
Ford Taurus with MDC				Ford Explorer with MDC			
Billing Code	# of	Initiated Fiscal Year	Rate	Billing Code	# of	Initiated Fiscal Year	Rate
364		FY 14/15	\$6,700	365		FY 14/15	\$9,253
364A		FY 15/16	\$6,644	365A		FY 15/16	\$9,847
364B		FY 16/17	\$7,191	365B		FY 16/17	\$10,415
364C		FY 17/18	\$12,442	365C		FY 17/18	\$16,367
364D		FY 18/19	\$15,768	365D		FY 18/19	\$18,661

ANNUAL COSTS WITH MAINTENANCE ONLY (NO FUEL)							
Ford Taurus with MDC				Ford Explorer with MDC			
Billing Code	# of	Initiated Fiscal Year	Rate	Billing Code	# of	Initiated Fiscal Year	Rate
366		FY 14/15	\$5,830	367		FY 14/15	\$6,853
366A		FY 15/16	\$5,774	367A		FY 15/16	\$7,447
366B		FY 16/17	\$6,321	367B		FY 16/17	\$8,015
366C		FY 17/18	\$11,572	367C		FY 17/18	\$13,967
366D		FY 18/19	\$14,103	367D		FY 18/19	\$15,331

ANNUAL COSTS WITH AIR TIME & SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE							
MDC (CF-31) Only for City Install ³				MDC (CF-31/19) Only ³			
Billing Code	# of	Initiated Fiscal Year	Rate	Billing Code	# of	Initiated Fiscal Year	Rate
375		FY 14/15	\$1,565	376		FY 14/15	\$1,565
375A		FY 15/16	\$1,565	376A		FY 15/16	\$1,565
375B		FY 16/17	\$1,565	376B		FY 16/17	\$1,565
375C		FY 17/18	\$6,378	376C		FY 17/18	\$6,378
375D		FY 18/19	\$13,737	376D		FY 18/19	\$13,737

ALPR with Install on LASD Vehicle			
Billing Code	# of	Initiated Fiscal Year	Rate
377		FY 14/15	\$4,650
377A		FY 15/16	\$4,650
377B		FY 16/17	\$4,650
377C		FY 17/18	\$4,650
377D		FY 18/19	\$4,650

Vehicle Purchases for Contract Additions			
Billing Code	# of	Vehicle Type	Rate
378		B/W Patrol Vehicle	\$89,993
379		Solid Sedan (Charger)	\$48,354
381		B/W BMW Motorcycle	\$53,917

Cost of all Equipment Purchased: \$0

Notes:

1. MDC & ALPR Costs for maintenance and upgrades after year 5 will be adjusted.
2. After Year 5 vehicles will be returned to LASD for reuse unless City exercises option to keep current vehicle.
3. MDC Equipment Costs Paid in Years 1 & 2.

Initials

City Official: KK

Unit Commander: [Signature]