RETHINKING EMOTIONS IN CONFUCIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract: The Confucian political philosophy is empirically grounded upon a private sphere of “emotion” in a more general sense, so “the becoming ontology” of emotion (Qing 情) stands as its footstone. As a characteristic of Confucian conception and its culture, this substantially private “emotional” experience deals with how to attain communal as well as individual harmony. In Confucian political philosophy, the initial claim is made onto the self-cultivation or moral cultivation on the part of each individual. “The becoming ontology” of emotion, which best reflects the nature of emotions, will be illustrated in four pairs of relationship: 1. Emotion vs. Shamanism (Wu 巫): from “the shamanism rationalized” to “shamanism-transformed emotion”; 2. Emotion vs. Rite (Li 礼): from “rite and Music do good to each other” to “rite comes out of emotions”; 3. Emotion vs. Human Nature (Xing 性): from “emotions arise out of human nature” to “mind unites and apprehends human nature and emotions”; 4. Emotions vs. Fact (Shi 実): “to love all equally” vs. “indiscriminate and mutual love”.

The Confucian political philosophy is empirically grounded upon a private sphere of “emotion” (Qing 情) in a more general sense, so “the becoming ontology of emotion” stands as its footstone. As a characteristic of Confucian conception and its culture, this substantially “emotional” experience deals with how to attain communal as well as individual harmony. In Western political theory, the individual end is dearly cherished but held off from the communal one, because the organic process is displaced which potentially connects the private experience of harmony to the establishment of social harmony. Although both David Hume

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2 But the inner meanings of emotion in Confucian contexts was neglected before the discovery of “Guodian Chu Slips”, see Chad Hansen, “Qing (Emotions) in the Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thoughts”, in Joel Marks and Roger T. Ames eds., Emotions in Asian Thought, State University of New York Press, 1994, pp. 181-212.
and Adam Smith single out “sympathy” as a forceful moral motivation. Confucianism goes further and conceives the sympathy-oriented “jen” as the origin of emotion and life and to attribute to “jen” the “integrity with heaven and earth”. In Confucian political philosophy, the initial claim is made onto the self-cultivation or moral cultivation on the part of each individual. And, on such a basis of personal experience, the further demand goes to the sphere of family, with an aim to secure an enduring reign, order and peace of the whole country, and ultimately the “perpetual peace or oneness of the universe”. It is an internal sequence that underlies the logical construction of Confucian political philosophy.

I. Understanding “the Differential Mode of Association” (Cha xu ge ju 差序格局): The Metaphor of “Concentric Circles”

The hierarchical structure typical of Confucian politics is sustained in a continuum from self and family through the state to the universe, the philosophy of which can be found in the saying that “you yourself desire rank and standing; then help others to get rank and standing. You want to turn your own merits to account; then help others to turn their to account—in fact, the ability to take one’s own feelings as a guide—that is the sort of thing that lies in the direction of Goodness”\(^4\). This approach to put oneself in others’ shoes, from a sociological perspective, corresponds to the “differential mode of association”, one of the important conclusions Xiaotong Fei the sociologist reached in his research of the rural community of China. “Differential mode of association” can be applied to the analysis of the traditional Chinese society, for the rural community stands for the basic social unit in such an agricultural society as China.

Unlike philosophers, who are obliged to produce a clear-cut concept, Xiaotong Fei came up with a metaphor of “concentric circles” instead to describe what he meant by “differential mode of association”. In his ground-breaking work *From the Soil: Foundations of Chinese Society* (1948), three points were made as follows:

1. “The self stands at the center and his social relations spread like the ripples that move away when a stone is thrown upon the water. Rather than fellowship on equal footing, the further a ripple is from the center, the loose the relationship it represents becomes.”\(^5\)

2. “Kinship is social relations based upon the fact of marriage and procreation. The network that is established through marriage and procreation expands in the same manner to reach an infinite number of people connected in


\(^4\)The Analec, 6.28. The English translation is borrowed from Arthur Waley.


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the past, present, and even the future. Thus, the dynamics of the family relations, as the most important ties in our society, can be compared to those of the ripples that travel away from the same center.

(3) “Our social structure is different from that of the West. Rather than neatly tied-up bundles of firewood, it is made up of circles of familial and social relations like radiating ripples that spread out from a center where a stone is thrown upon the water. Each person stands at the common center of circles of his social influence. How far the ripples travel determines the boundary of one’s relations. And the circle(s) of relationship he turns to at a given occasion may not be the same.”

As seen from above, the self is for a Chinese the core of his social “concentric circles”. Just as the radiating ripples become “thinner” when they travel further off the center, within the whole network of one’s social relations that extend or expand from himself standing at the center, the closer a relation is, the more intimacy is suggested between himself and the person in that relation. By the same token, detachment is more predictable with regard to a remoter relation. This is how Confucians understood about social institution, for as early as in the original Confucianism it was established that the feeling of love adapts to the ever-changing interpersonal relationships. From a Confucian perspective, therefore, the conception of “indiscriminate love” by Mo Tzu was simply a stagnant pond of water. However, on the other hand, even relations at the remotest distance can be traced back to the center of a self. Thus, the self could expect himself to reach out as far as the universe through his circles of relations.

In (1), the pattern of “concentric circles” is found to be the supportive structure of the Chinese society. In (2), the relationship between the center and any of the circles at a given distance is offered for further explanation. In Xiaotong Fei’s opinion, the inner circles or, in other words, the smallest concentric circle and the one immediately next to it are composed of kinfolks, related either vertically by blood (mainly through “procreation”) or horizontally by marriage, eventually to give rise to a crisscross of social relations, in effect, an institutionalized Confucian philosophy.

In (3), an attempt at a comparative study is made in terms of social structure. In a comparative light, the organism of a Western society is shown to be a process of binding up firewood, in which, just like the firewood neatly fastened into separate bundles, smaller or bigger, any stick will not be mistaken for another one tied up in a different bundle. Besides strict membership, even the hierarchy of and identity with a given social group seem to be predetermined. By contrast, in Chinese society co-exit the “concentric circles” that spread out from each distinct individual, and his social relations like the circles of ripple are subject to fluidity, enlarged or shrunk, as circumstances change.

Admittedly, the metaphor is strong enough to point up the character of the static structure of the traditional Chinese society, but it fails to cast light on its dynamics of the internal relations. The first point is right about the pattern of “concentric circles”, for, in terms of social structure, the self is also understood as the absolute center, the evidence of which can be found in “On this account, the
ruler must himself be possessed of the good qualities, and then he may require them in the people. He must not have the bad qualities in himself, and then he may require that they shall not be in the people.” However, from a philosophical point of view, is the self a justifiable logical starting point? Historically, the mention of human nature or mind, among others, in a Confucian context, preceded that of the self. Or if put in this way, what appeals to Xiaotong Fei never goes beyond the self, the “outside-the-self”, and their mutual relationship, while the “inside-the-self”, an ever-present concern in Confucianism, is neglected, not to mention, in my opinion, its close relation to emotions.

The second point is also right in its identification of the inner circle(s) and particularly of marriage and procreation as two key factors that influence the major social relations such as affinity and descent in the traditional Chinese society. However, the way the concentric circles outside the inner ones keep on moving and spreading still remains in the darkness. Does the kinship apply to people not related through descent or marriage? Why does someone “seek rightness at the cost of his own life” and does so for someone else outside his kinship? How should we deal with the conflicts that arise in the real world when “a father will screen his son, and a son his father”? In these cases, it seems that the family relationships do not account for much, for it is impossible to treat all the other social members the same way as to one’s familial relations. Thus, a more universal “greater feeling” is expected to play an important role instead among off-the-center concentric circles. And, it becomes more powerful as it draws nearer to the more marginal ones, while the “lesser feeling”, bound up with the relations by blood or marriage, becomes a less appealing power.

The problem with the comparative study in the third point is that the individual person of “differential mode of association”, when placed at the center of concentric circles, was attributed a Chinese-styled egoism, a plausible parallel to the individual atomism of the Western society. However, “When a Chinese shifts his personal concern back to himself; the focus is not so much upon his ego as upon the self, i.e., the micro milieu outside his body. A better description might be the ism of outside-the-self.” In this connection, even the conception of “each one for himself” by Yang Zhu, an extremist expression of the ism of outside-the-self in the history of Chinese thoughts, is far from a celebration of subjectivity oriented to lift man up to the measurement of the universe. This is a correct observation on the differences in the understanding of individualism in a Chinese or Western context, while the “humanism” and “individuality” attributable to Chinese culture are no more than the expressions Western sinologists as well as domestic scholars borrowed from the Western discourse in their interpretation of Chinese thoughts. Here, I want to raise a further question: what on earth tells the self situated at the center of “concentric circles” apart from the “individual” that

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8Great Learning IX: 4. The English translation is borrowed from James Legge.
9Analects, 13.18.

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belongs to a traditional Western society? Since the self as an individual is concerned both about the inner circle of his kinship and about his relations to the more marginal “concentric circles” in terms of emotion, emotion is believed to play a more important role as a crucial part of the inside-the-self of a traditional Chinese.

In sum, “differential mode of association” is more powerful in its illustration of “hierarchy” and “sequence”, but less so about the “harmony” of the structure of the traditional Chinese society. In my opinion, the key to sustain the harmonious whole of differences is emotions, the much-neglected emotions man finds himself endowed with.

II. From “Inside-the-Self” to “Outside-the-Self”: Will Emotions Reach Far?

The biggest problem with the metaphor of “concentric circles” is the absence of the mechanism “to extend kin-directed love”, which is also one of the most important issues addressed by Confucianism—will the kinship-centered emotions find their way to the further ends away from the center? The efforts to find an answer began as early as Mencius, when he developed the concept of “humane nature” to anchor “extension of love” into a solid theoretic foundation. Furthermore, Mencius drew on what he designated “the good end” (or good-in-nature) as a psychological starting point or source, which activates the process of “carrying out goodness”, voluntarily from the center of the “concentric circles” to the distant margins.

The criticism it readily invited aims at the possibility to “extend” the emotions, which yield to the changes in the social relations where emotions get embedded. Is “love” extended only within the inner circles, unable to be carried out further or not at all? Similar skeptical voices have already been heard. “The ‘extension of love’ is above all the key to Confucianism. Intimacy between relatives is self-evident (as a matter of fact), but it promises no universal ethics in its own right unless it reaches out to the remote relations or even the unrelated. … To extend the relative-to-relative intimacy, outwardly from the center in a sequential manner to the unrelated mass, is supposed to give rise to an ethic system Xiaotong Fei described as ‘concentric circles’. The difficulty lies in the fact that, on the way out, the mutual emotional commitment already dies down before “love” reaches far, and eventually dissolves into the remotest relationships. It fails to go further, so it fails to reach out. On the other hand, the pattern of interpersonal conflict is found also surviving between any two families of the numerous ones at large. So, the model of relative-to-relative intimacy is not a sufficient ethical foundation to support the whole society, nor a factor of decisive significance in the resolution of social conflicts. From the family ethics derives no social ethics, nor derives the love of "the other" from the love of one’s kin. This is a fatal blow to the vitality of Confucianism.”

The above argument is based on two assumptions. One is the fiction of “a stranger”, i.e., anyone outside one’s network of connections. Accordingly none but the “stranger” is identified as a typical “the other” in philosophical terms.

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Then, will the marginalized other (the stranger out of relation) be affected by more “personal” feelings? Furthermore, in the traditional Chinese society, whose network of connections is based on corporate bodies of blood relation or local community, will “love” find its way to the stranger coming from outside the corporate bodies? The assumption of “a stranger” is challengeable, because it missed factual interpersonal dynamics between strangers. Take the earthquake that afflicted Wenchuan in China in 2008. Why did so many volunteers (including foreigners) devote themselves to the rescue efforts out of their sympathy? Why did their sympathetic feelings reach for the strangers thousands of miles away? Should the fictional “stranger” exist, most Chinese would have remained apathetic in the face of the catastrophic damage the earthquake caused. However, the fact is quite the opposite. The Ethics of Care also support this point in some meaning “The ethics of care advocates care as a value for society as well as household. In this there are some resemblances to the Confucian view of public morality as an extension of private morality.”13

The other assumption is the more implicit Confucian claim of “restraint of emotions”, which is believed responsible for the failure to extend emotions further to reach the unrelated “stranger”. On one hand, Confucianism accepts emotions both as natural endowment and instinctual need, saying “joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, aversion, and desire are not what man learns to feel” in reply to the question about “what human emotion is.”14 On the other hand, it also emphasizes the “containment of seven types of emotion,”15 as the commentator Kong Yingda said, “…the seven types of emotion are volatile, precariously poised between the good and the bad. Thus, containment must be imposed.” The single word “containment” adds to the claim of “restraint of emotion” with a political implication. It is widely held that the dominant claim by Confucianism of emotions is “restraint by principle”, undoubtedly under the sway of Neo-Confucianism, which predominated since Song and Ming dynasties and later even went to the rationalist extreme in calling for the “smothering of emotions and desires”.

However, as early as in pre-Qin era, emotions were once highly encouraged in the original Confucianism, the evidence of which has been found in “Guodian Chu Slips” of Jingmen (Hubei Province) unearthed in 1993. Then, why did the claim of restraint of emotions begin to prevail in the later periods of Chinese history? The answer may possibly have something to do with the assumption of emotions as identical with desires and the consequent restrain and control of emotions. In this respect, the Confucian claim to control “mind” through “rites” is intended to restrain emotions to an extent Confucius asserted in “what I desired no longer overstepped the boundaries of right”.16 “Emotion”, one of the “soft” kernels of Confucian political philosophy, fortifies the philosophy with an empirical foundation. The emotion-centered political philosophy is put to practice through the following approaches:

14 “Evolution of Rites” in Records of Rites.
15 Ibid.
16 Analects, 2.4.
First, the personal sphere of Confucianism covers primarily the self-cultivation of each individual, out of which he is to attain the inner harmony. Then, by virtue of the sympathy “to feel others in oneself”, the private experience of self-cultivation is indeed put in a larger perspective of “inter-subjectivity” for mutual empathy. From the individual located at the center to strangers at different levels of relation, the inner driving force is to extend emotions, though admittedly the “quantity” of emotions in the process varies accordingly. By contrast, the concept of “common sense” in Kant’s ethics and aesthetics is closer to the assertion that “man is endowed with the same heart; the heart with the same principle”, an idealistic orientation obviously different from the aestheticism in Chinese “celebration of emotion”.

Second, art, or the aesthetic education of emotion, is also responsible for the practice of Confucian political philosophy. What Confucius demonstrates through the “distraction in the arts” and “perfection by Music” is intended to bring out the unity of aesthetic refinement with moral exaltation in its equal emphasis of the two. Either in the case of poetry, which strengthens the fraternity of any social population, or in Music, which enables personal equanimity and promotes social peace, “emotion” is invariably registered to have played a role in the process of one’s character-building. This insight of Music as a powerful political instrument is quite rare in other cultures of the world, except some similarity found in the “city-state” civilizations of the ancient Greek.

Third, by virtue of the “common sense”, the “miniature institution” of Confucian ethics is to be realized in the domain of family, the value of which is of high importance to guarantee harmony, for, without a harmonious family system, the harmony of a macro-institution would find nowhere to be grounded upon. According to Shuming Liang, “For a Chinese, the family life is the first level of his social life, while his relationship with relatives, friends, or neighbors the second level. At the two levels, where the social and moral obligations and laws can be found, what he asks for can be observed while the boundary of his social interactions is also defined.” All of this is different from the Western family system based on atomism.

Last, the transcendence the empirical Confucian political philosophy hopes to attain points to a “quasi-religious” morality, that is, rather a “private sphere” morality for inward transcendence than a “social morality” that governs the public sphere. And, the tri-dimensional process of inner surpassing, as illustrated in the legend of “Zeng Tzu’s metaphor” (Zeng dian zhi xue 曾点之学) or “Confucius and Yan Hui’s delight” (Kong yan le chu 孔颜乐处), points to the unity of the religious, the moral, and the aesthetic, which Youlan Feng described as “Heaven-Earth State” and Zehou Li as “Aesthetic State”.

In sum, “emotion” not only finds its way through the “concentric circles” of traditional Chinese society but also underlies the Confucian philosophy of politics as its empirical cornerstone. Thus, we may call it “ontology of emotion” or attach

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18 Xun Tzu, *On Music*.
to it “the becoming” if “ontology” itself suggests too strong the implications of “being” understood in the context of European philosophy. “The becoming ontology of emotion”\(^ {20}\), which best reflects the nature emotions, will be illustrated in four pairs of relationship.

III. Emotion v. Shamanism (Wu 巫): From “the Shamanism Rationalized” (Wu shi chuan tong 巫史傳統) to “Shamanism-Transformed Emotion”

In terms of origin, the conception of “emotion” derives from what the ancient Chinese once understood about the nature of mankind. On the other hand, as far as the unique structure of the cultural psychology of Chinese is concerned, “emotion” is closely related to the “shamanism” or in other words, it derives indirectly from the unique tradition of shamanism.

The so-called “shamanism rationalized” is a new interpretation by Li Zehou of the source of Chinese thoughts in his discussions of the rite of shamanism in “Rethinking Confucius” (1980)\(^ {21}\), “Dialogues on the History of Shamanism” and “Supplement to Dialogues on the History of Shamanism.” According to him, the characteristics of Chinese culture and its philosophy arise out of the rationalization of the activities by shamans. At the heart of the rationalization takes place the transformation from shamanism to rite, while the transformation from shamanism to history, the union of shaman with king, and the chief shaman-king appear as the contributory factors in the process.\(^ {22}\) That’s how “Shamanism rationalized” was adopted in Li Zehou’s own translation as the traditions of shamanism.\(^ {23}\) As the translation suggests, the emphasis was put not so much upon the “aesthetic” as the “rational” aspect, although Li Zehou accepted “emotion” as one of the basic characteristics of shamanism as well. “In the ‘rite of shamanism’, the emotional element is of great importance. The activity of shamanism is an ecstatic experience that engages the shaman or all of the participants. It is an exhibition and exposure of irrational or unconscious passion.”\(^ {24}\)

Although Li Zehou introduced the important role of emotion, his attention still focused on the rationalization of “shamanism” to “history” for a direct transition to the humanistic “rite” and “jen”. Recessive as they might be, the “emotions” still survive in the unconsciousness of ancient Chinese culture, particularly in the early Confucianism and its culture. In my opinion, the constructive role of “the history of shamanism”, in the shaping of the structure of Chinese cultural psychology, not only lies in the rational transition to rite, but also in the aesthetic process of “emotion” (which I call “the shamanism- transformed


\(^{21}\)Zehou Li, “Rethinking Confucius”, in *Chinese Social Sciences* II (1980). This article was reprinted in Zehou Li’s *Ancient Chinese Thoughts* (Beijing: People’s Press, 1985).

\(^{22}\)Zehou Li, “Supplement to Dialogues on the History of Shamanism”, in *Historical Ontology* (Beijing: Sanlian Press, 2006), 373.


\(^{24}\)Ibid. 165.

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emotions”) as well. Thus, the Confucianism-influenced experience becomes a process of “quasi-religious” feelings, with their origin deeply rooted in the shamanism; the Confucian ethics accordingly becomes “quasi-religious” morality. That Confucianism is not a religion is largely due to the surviving “traditions of shamanism” and the nature of “emotion” itself.

IV. Emotion vs. Rite (Li 禮): From “Rite and Music Do Good to Each Other” to “Rite Comes Out of Emotions” (Li zuo yuqing 禮作於情)

In view of the ancient shamanism, emotion, the passionate engagement, is never separable from rite, the rationalized shaman performance. Since emotion is expressed mostly through Music, the age-old conception of the “mutual benefit between rite and music” or “the oneness of emotion and rite” began as early as in the times of the Duke of Zhou.

Confucius believed that he was witnessing an increasingly deteriorating role of Music and the collapse of rite. The tradition that “rite and Music do good to each other” was broken up. Music, being astray from the institution and laws of rite, was reduced to merely sensual forms to cater to the kings in their pursuit of extravagance; rite, unable to play its role in ritual performances and moral transformation, rose to abstract ideas. Confronted with this historical predicament, Confucius suggested a return to the traditional harmony of rite and Music and proposed the idea of “perfect beauty” and “perfect goodness” as the unity of goodness and beauty. Rite and Music, redefined in terms of the unity of beauty and goodness, are expected to play a double role as the “guide of joy” and “guide of morality”. “Music is joy; it is a feeling man cannot get away from.” This feeling is an aesthetic pleasure out of human emotions, and therefore beauty and goodness are located in pan-aesthetic relationships, with the communication and coordination of emotions going throughout. Thus, rite and Music becomes intertwined in Confucian political philosophy, as it is said that to examine the Music is to learn the politics and the knowledge of Music is approximate to that of the rite. In Music is the access to emotions; the sensibility for things precedes the stirred emotions. “Things come up and hold sway over man”; “the ancient Kings set down rite and created Music… to teach the commoners good from bad and to restore the humanity.” Only through the cultivation and refinement of emotions, do “the kin love each other and live by jen.” In sum, “in Music is the access to ethics.”

As circumstances changed, Music was witnessed to be suffering a lower status and an increasing detachment from rite, and even its special importance to the Confucian political philosophy was particularly downplayed. However, since the tradition of rite-and-Music went downhill, rite was reestablished on rational grounds of various forms, while Music was even retarded instead of simultaneously strengthened, only to give rise to the separation and alienation of

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25 Analects, 3.25.
26 "Records of Music” in Records of Rites.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.

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rite from Music. Besides, freed from the institution of court, music in later times found its way into the circle of literati and folk culture. Further reasons can be found in the Confucian practice of education. Music, one of the Six Classics of the Confucian canon, was said to have been lost in the burning of books in Qin dynasty. The problem with this speculation is why only Music was lost? Some even goes so far as to reject Music as the canon, asserting that it is an appendix of score to the Book of Poetry and affiliation with the rite. "The origin of Music is in the three hundred pieces of the Book of Poetry; the use of Music in the seventeen pieces of the Records of Rites." This may be a more valid speculation, for it shows the reasons why the practice of Music stopped short. On one hand, the instrumental, vocal, and recital performances of Music did not carry on; one the other hand, Music went along with the rite not so much in practice as in text. Here, facts of history count for much. The Six Classics was mentioned in the writings of pre-Qin era, say "The Evolution of Heaven" in Zhuang Tzu, but in the Han dynasty, only five of them appeared in such account as "the later sages set out Five Classics," with only Music left unmentioned. Confucius embarked upon a multi-disciplined educational project that centered on "poetry, documents, rites, and music"; while undoubtedly the musical education was believed to play a more important role in "cultivating a broad-minded and kind-hearted man." Together with the Book of Poetry, Music resorted to emotions in order to facilitate the spread of Confucian ideas. "Rite and Music are the common keys in any Confucian argument about family and politics. Therefore, the compilers of Analects placed the chapter on rite-and-music right after the first two chapters respectively on learning and governing." Obviously, such arrangement of the first three chapters is quite symptomatic of a given political philosophy.

Thanks to the direct relationship between family and politics, two important subjects in Confucianism, the public sphere for conducting political affairs has to be understood in terms of the private sphere for regulating a family. This is of course different from the rigid demarcation of public sphere from the private one in the West. Or, in other words, for Confucians, the understanding and elucidating of political issues depend on the metaphor of family, and the implicit "emotions" as an important factor to sustain a family must be taken into account. In "Guodian Chu Slips" (an unverified version of the lost documents of the "the School of Tzu Ssu"), there appeared such key notions as "rites are performed out of human emotion," "emotions come from human nature, rite from emotions, and reverence from rite," and "rite comes from emotions and gets

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30"The Record of Music" in Book of Sung.
31Yichen Shao, General Introduction to the "Records of Rites."
32"Evolution of Heaven" in Zhuang Tzu.
33Jia Lu, “Dao Ji” in New Analects.
34“The Commentary of Canon” in The Records of Rites.
37Guo Dian Chu Slips.
38Ibid.

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encouraged.” In either case, emotions (joy, anger, sorrow) were recognized as the root of rite.

For Confucius himself, emotions were acted upon more often than not in poetry and Music. “Let a man be first incited by the Songs, then given a firm footing by the study of ritual, and finally perfected by Music.” Evidently, the incitement by poetry was placed as an antecedent of the sequence, while rite or jen was supposed to be performed or perfected through Music. “Music and rite were held equally important, but Music was placed above the rite, because only Music was considered the embodiment of his attainment of personality. This is the cornerstone where Confucius builds up his educational system.” Realizing the “self-awareness of the art of the highest order”, Confucius said “Set your heart upon the Way, support yourself by its power, lean upon Goodness, seek distraction in the Arts.” Here, in contrast to the heteronomy by the Way, virtue and jen, as the expression “set upon” or “support by” or “lean upon” suggests, only “seek distraction in the art” is supposed to reflect the autonomy in the aesthetic freedom. Thus, for the Confucians, the highest artistic ideal is rather the disinterested and bounds-free transcendence than simply the “goodness-anchored beauty.” Seen from Confucius’ perspective, it is more than “rite comes from emotions”, emphasizing that the performance of rite is completed in the aesthetic emotion or feeling.

V. Emotions vs. Human Nature (Xing 性): From “Emotions Arise out of Human Nature” (Qing chu yu xing 情出于性) to “Mind Unites and Apprehends Human Nature and Emotions” (Xin tong xing qing 心統性情)

In ancient Chinese philosophy, “human nature” and “emotions” were often mentioned together like a compound. For example, “if everybody remains true to his human nature-emotions, will Rite and Music serve any function?” However, there exist subtle differences between the two.

In the discovery of “Guodian Chu Slips”, an emotion-themed piece of writing entitled “Human Nature Derives from Mandate” draws wider attention. Its emphasis upon emotions (mentioned more than 20 times) highlights as well as confirms the exceptional Confucian commitment to emotions. There, the best-known formula concerning emotions is “human nature derives from the Mandate; the Mandate comes from the heaven; the Way starts with emotions; emotions arise out of human nature.” In this cosmic model emerge a schema of genesis and logic of evolution—“heaven-mandate-human nature-emotions-the Way”. However, “emotions”, which serves as the link between “human nature” and “the

39Ibid.
40Analects, 8.8. The translation is borrowed from Arthur Waley.
42Analects, 7.6.
43“Horses’ Hoofs” in Zhuang Tzu.
44“Human Nature Derives from Mandate” in “Guo Dian Chu Slips”

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Way”, is often interpreted as “real conditions or states”, since that is how emotions was understood in pre-Qin era.\(^{35}\)

As to the relationship between human nature and emotions, a more important statement is found at the same time, which asserts “truthfulness is the direction of emotions. Emotions arise out of human nature.”\(^{45}\) Of course, “human nature” and “emotions” are still very close concepts. For example, in Daide Anthology of Records of Rites, it is recorded that “human nature” referred to “joy, anger, desire, fear, and anxiety”.\(^{47}\) Even Li Ao of the Tang Dynasty also said “what bewilders man about human nature is emotions. Joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, aversion, and desire are all stirrings of emotions. When emotions fall in the darkness, human nature will be hidden away.”\(^{48}\) After all, human nature is distinct from emotions. When “human nature” is intended to designate the common attributes found in all humanity, “emotions” is applied to the same ordinary feelings out of human nature, with a mixture of both true and affected expressions. In addition, it is said that “so long as one is sincere, his mistakes are not evil; so long as one is insincere, even his painstaking efforts will not be appreciated; with sincerity, man does nothing to win trust.”\(^{49}\) In these contexts, emotions are demonstrated as indicative of human nature only if they are sincere. More often than not, “emotions” is used to refer to the so-called “seven types of feeling and six types of desire”, as we find in such idioms as “desire arises out of human nature”, “evil arises out of human nature”, and “joyfulness arises out of human nature.”\(^{50}\) In pre-Qin era, “emotions” was hardly independent from “desires”, with “desires” included as a more underlying element. However, later Confucians seemed more inclined to narrow down the concept of “emotions” to that of “desires”, thus paving the way to various theories of “restraint of emotions”.

Historically, due to the predominance of rationalism and particularly Neo-Confucianism, the theme of extolment of emotions as well as various theories about human nature and emotions survived as a latent force in the depth of Chinese culture and thoughts. The conception that “mind commands both human nature and emotions”, which first appeared in Chang Tsai’s writings, was picked up by Chu Hsi for further explication and development. In Chu Hsi’s philosophy of mind, “jen, rightness, riteness, and intelligence belong to human nature; sympathy, shame, repulsion, courtesy, and sense of right and wrong belong to emotions; to love with jen, to hate with rightness, to be courteous with rite, and to learn with intelligence are what the mind is capable of; human nature is the principle in the mind, emotions the instrumentality of the mind, and mind the control and command of human nature and emotions.”\(^{51}\) Obviously, the human

\(^{35}\)Graham the sinologist had made this point quite early. A. C. Graham, *Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China*, (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1989), 98.


\(^{46}\)Cf. “Human Nature Derives from Mandate”.

\(^{47}\)Daide Anthology of Records of Rites.

\(^{48}\)Li Ao, *Recovery of the Nature*.

\(^{49}\)C. f. “Human Nature Derives from Mandate”.

\(^{50}\)C. f. “Anthology” (II), in Guodian Chu Slips.


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nature was understood as moral nature, the Heavenly principle within, while, for that matter, “emotions” were reserved for ethic relationships-engaged ones. More importantly, it naturally followed from the above quotations that the mind commands human nature and emotions and for this reason embraces the both. When Chu Hsi declared that “since the mind commands human nature and emotions, it includes them both”, he actually attributed to the “mind” a role as a master of moral consciousness. During the predominance of Neo-Confucianism and even after, history witnessed the subjugation in the mainstream Confucianism of both “emotions” and “human nature”, with the distortion of the role of emotions leading to an extremist attitude that called for rooting out emotions and desires. However, the theoretical suppression can never drive them out of real life, and in the social practice of Confucianism, the roles of “emotions” can never be replaced or displaced.

VI. Emotion vs. Fact (Shi 實): “To Love All Equally” (Fan ai zhong 泛愛眾) vs. “Indiscriminate and Mutual Love” (Jian xiang ai 兼相愛)

Mo Tzu’s political philosophy is the next of kin to modern thinking, because it addresses the political matters out of utilitarian and realistic considerations. Though Mo Tzu followed Confucius in the latter’s reverence of the sage hood of the Three Dynasties, the two thinkers indeed made different choices. Confucius followed Zhou Dynasty’s tradition of rite and Music as an access to moral education and transformation, while Mo Tzu picked out Yu (Yu is the mythical founder of the Xia Dynasty, called Yu the Great) as the model of pragmatism. Rather than taking adaptable measures as Confucius did for the restoration of rite and Music, Mo Tzu went to the opposite extreme of “the condemnation of wasteful musical activities as the leverage in maintaining the peace of the state and universe”, although he was right in pointing out the fact that “the more ostentatious the ritual Music is, the less effective the government becomes.” This led to his conclusion that “sages do not perform Music.” The implied “non-music” claim is all of a piece with elimination of emotions. Of course, when it comes to emotions, Mo Tzu deviated again from Confucius’ “love one’s kin”, and produced “non-discrimination of love”, fiercely attacked upon by Mencius for its being “indiscriminate”. The universally shared love is not love at all; the equally shared emotions are an overflow of emotions. “Mo Tzu’s principle is--- to love all equally, which does not acknowledge the peculiar affection due to a father.”

Thanks to the discrimination of degree in what Confucius suggested even as he said that “to have kindly feelings towards everyone”; the concentric structure can be sustained by circles of different radii. By contrast, the notion of

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52 Chu Hsi, Chu TzuYu-Lei, Vol. 20.
53 Chu Hsi, Chu TzuYu-Lei, Vol.98.
54 Mo Tzu, “San Bian” in Mo Tzu.
55 Ibid.
56 Mo Tzu, “Da Qu”, in Mo Tzu.
57 Mencius, IIA.
58 Mencius, IIB. The English translation is borrowed from James Legge.
“indiscriminate love” can be rendered only in a single circle, with any point along the circumference standing at the same distance from the center. This can be found in the notions like “indiscriminate and mutual love”, “love others the way one loves himself”, “regard others as one regards himself”, “respect others’ house as one respects his own”, “respect others’ family as one respect his own”, and “respect other countries as one respects his own.” In comparison with the Confucian continuum mentioned in the first part, the ultimate “universe” is absent in the sequence, while the “house” is inserted as a link between self and family. These changes are very telling evidence to confirm the shifted attention on the part of Mo Tzu from the family ties to the practical aspects of a household. Besides, either in his criticism of the Confucians as “supernumerary ornaments, rite and Music” or his observation that “clothes are not expressions of conduct”, his rejection of the formalism of rite is seen to have prevented him from a look into the content and have led him to relocate himself on a more practical ground of activism.

The attack by the Confucians at the Mo Tzu’s school (and the Legalist as well), in addition to differences between these schools of thought, can provide modern political philosophy a new point of view. Take the Legalists, who addressed problems exclusively from a utilitarian perspective. They called on “doing anything to strengthen the country, regardless of the established rules; doing anything to benefit the common people, regardless of the ritual prescriptions.” No residue of emotions is found in such an extremist’s prejudice. The Qin dynasty, the first unified empire ever in the history of China, strengthened its state under this principle. However, it did not survive the second generation, because to rule a country does not simply mean to strengthen it.

VII. The “Emotions” between the Individual and the Corporate Body: Rethinking Neo-Liberalism and the Communitarianism

The value of Confucianism has an irreplaceable role in the contemporary debates among political philosophies, with a very unique perspective to offer particularly in the debate between neo-liberalism and communitarianism. Then, how does the Confucian political philosophy, emotions-oriented, closer to and yet different from communitarianism, find its way into the contemporary political theories and practice?

At first sight, the Confucian political philosophy stands just opposite to the neo-liberalism, which is a derivation from the “atomism” and relies on an abstract universal principle appealing to rational individuals. By contrast, the “self” in Confucianism is an individual inseparable from the corporate body he finds himself in, or the self situated at the center of the “concentric circles”.

59“Fei Ru” in Mo Tzu.
60Mo Tzu, “Gong Meng” in Mo Tzu.
61“Geng Fa” in Shang Jun Shu.
62Erin Cline argued that “a comparison with early Confucian views can serve as a resource for developing Rawls account in order address some of communitarian and feminist critics, such as the claim that Rawls neglected areas such as the family”, see Erin Cline, Confucius, Rawls, and the Sense of Justice, Fordham University Press, 2012, p. 5.
Apparently, at least in this respect, Confucianism seems quite close to the communitarianism. However, the true Confucian political thoughts are far from a parallel to communitarianism, which has become theoretically drained because it fails to take emotions into account. In this respect, Confucianism and communitarianism never meet.

Both neo-liberalism and communitarianism are based on the dichotomy that divides individual from the society and from the corporate body. On the contrary, from a Confucian political perspective, which allows a mutual transformation between private sphere and public sphere, the private is by nature inseparable from the public. Therefore, the rigid displacement of the private from the public (or vice versa) will not work out the fluid dynamics between the two.

For Michael R. Martin, it is not enough for the Western scholars to approach Confucius’ thoughts from the concept of “wholism”, because Confucius himself never attempted a separation of the individual rigidly apart from the society like two polar extremes. Instead, the society was understood as the process of interpersonal dynamics, so conflicts take place rather between individuals than between the individual and the society.63 This argument is not strengthened by its resource to individualism, in the sense that the self in Confucian political philosophy is a socialized person and the society as a corporate body accordingly is a derivation of each distinct person.

Michael Martin is right when he approached the relationship between the individual and society from the perspective of mobilism, because the polarity of the two is rejected in the true Confucianism. However, Michael R. Martin did not recognize the presence of emotions in the interpersonal dynamics. Therefore, the return to “emotions” as the defining character of man’s interactions is the key to the understanding of the cream of crop of Confucian political philosophy and of the loopholes in neo-liberalism and communitarianism. In this regard, the importance of “aesthetic order” Roger Ames emphasized in a Confucian community unveils the role of a mediator emotions play between the liberalism and collectivism.64